Boeing's 22-Year Quality Mirage: AS9100 Non-Certification, Supplier Fraud, and Global Passenger Risk (8,000-12,000 -Planes 2002-PRESENT)

EVERETT, Wash. - Aug. 23, 2025 - PRLog -- For over two decades, Boeing has demanded its suppliers maintain AS9100 certification—the global standard for aerospace quality—while failing to achieve it themselves. In June 2024, Elizabeth Lund, then Boeing Vice President of Quality, publicly claimed Boeing was "willing to obtain AS9100 certification" after 22 years of negligence. Her statement raised deep concerns, particularly as she retired later that year, leaving behind a culture of quiet noncompliance continued by her successor, Doug Ackerman (35 Year Boeing employee promoted to VP Quality 2022).

Conflict of Interest: Boeing on the Accreditation Council

Evidence confirms that Boeing sat on the ANSI–ANAB Management Systems Accreditation Council (MSAC)—a council publicly listed on ANSI–ANAB's own website—with the authority to grant, suspend, or withdraw certifications.

How could Boeing sit on this council, making life-and-death certification decisions about its suppliers, when it was not AS9100 certified itself?

"As a recognized quality expert and Boeing shareholder, I find it incomprehensible that Boeing could occupy a seat on the council with the power to grant, suspend, or withdraw AS9100 certification for two decades, while never being certified itself. This is not governance—it's a betrayal of every passenger who steps onto a Boeing aircraft."

— DARYL GUBERMAN

Boeing's Conflict of Interest at a Glance

Entity	Role	Conflict
Boeing	Non-AS9100 certified aerospace giant 2002-2024(MAYBE)	Sat on ANSI–ANAB MSAC with certification powers
ANSI–ANAB MSAC	Management System Accreditation Council managing AS9100 certifications can grant,suspend and withdraw certification.	Listed Boeing as a council member
Boeing Suppliers	Forced to obtain AS9100 via ANSI–ANAB accreditation REASON WHY 1.July 2002 Supplier Bulletin AS9100 CERTIFICATION must be ANSI-ANAB ACCREDITED 2. Boeing called ANSI-ANAB out on Supplier Portal or international equivalent 3. ANSI-ANAB Website Webpage Management System Accreditation Council ( grant, suspend or withdraw certification)	Subject to oversight Boeing did not follow

Critical AS9100 Failures Leading to Aircraft Risk

AS9100 Clause	Requirement	Boeing's Failure	Potential Aircraft Risk
7.1.5 Monitoring & Measurement Resources	Calibrate tools for precision manufacturing.	Relied solely on supplier paperwork without independent verification.	Fatigue-critical components may fail mid-flight.
8.4.2 Control of External Providers	Mandates supplier oversight and audits.	Accepted certificates without on-site inspection.	Components of unknown origin or improper heat treatment.
8.5.1 Control of Production & Service Provision	Enforce welding, heat treatment, and NDT processes.	Failed to validate special process compliance (e.g., NADCAP).	Weld or material failure in critical systems.
9.2 Internal Audit	Conduct routine internal audits.	Audits non-existent or unrecognized by employees.	Defects remain undetected, escalating fleet-wide.
10.2 Nonconformity & Corrective Action	Identify and fix defects systematically.	No certified QMS to enforce corrections.	Latent flaws may result in catastrophic incidents.

Culture of Silence in Quality Management

Doug Ackerman, who stepped into the VP of Quality role after Elizabeth Lund (2022), mirrors the silent management approach that has plagued Boeing for decades. Between April and July 2002, Boeing implemented a policy of accepting supplier certifications for critical processes and quality management while drastically reducing onsite inspections. Source inspections were deemed redundant, and Boeing relied solely on suppliers sending certifications and parts, without performing meaningful audits.

This hands-off approach removed essential oversight and allowed unverified materials, welding, heat treatment, and non-destructive testing (NDT) to enter production unchecked.

As a special note, Doug Ackerman has served on the Board of the Performance Review Institute (PRI)—the organization responsible for implementing NADCAP-National Aerospace and Defense Contractors Accreditation Program certification—since 2022-present, further intertwining Boeing management with the very certification system it required from suppliers while avoiding its own internal compliance.

The result: a culture where certificates replaced verification, and silence replaced accountability, leaving critical aerospace components—and the passengers who rely on them—at risk.

Supplier Fraud and Public Betrayal

Boeing's presence on ANSI–ANAB's Management System Accreditation Council enabled it to dictate which suppliers were deemed "compliant" while never being held to the same scrutiny. In July 2002, Boeing required ANSI–ANAB-accredited AS9100 certificates from suppliers; in October 2003, it forced suppliers into OASIS (Online Aerospace Supplier Information System), run by the International Aerospace Quality Group (IAQG). At the time, Boeing effectively controlled IAQG and wielded influence over OASIS for many years afterwards—yet Boeing itself was never listed.

This demonstrates a systemic conflict: Boeing controlled the very system used to verify supplier compliance while avoiding independent oversight of its own operations.

Mr. Guberman is no stranger to the challenges facing aerospace quality. On April 17, 2024, he attended the DHS Subcommittee Whistleblower Meeting concerning Boeing's deeply concerning quality practices   https://www.newstribune.com/photos/2024/apr/18/3749044/.   At that meeting, Mr. Guberman revealed that Boeing had abandoned on-site supplier audits for more than 22 years, relying instead on a paper-based certification system riddled with conflicts of interest. Boeing simultaneously forced suppliers into AS9100 certification under the watch of ANSI-ANAB, where Boeing held influence on the accreditation committees that could grant, suspend, or withdraw certifications.

"Boeing sat on both sides of the table - enforcing AS9100 on their suppliers while sitting inside the very accreditation bodies that governed certification," Guberman stated. "That is a recipe for systemic failure."

Unsafe Skies by Design

By replacing verified certification with compliance claims, Boeing placed the integrity of 8,000–12,000 aircraft at risk. Without verified internal audits, physical supplier oversight, or process validation, no one can confirm if critical aircraft parts were properly heat treated, welded, or non-destructively tested.

This is not simply a breach—it is a global quality deception with potentially fatal consequences.

:IMPORTANT:   2024 Boeings Willingness To Attain AS9100 After 22 Years

Boeing pursuing AS9100 certification now from ANSI–ANAB accredited registrar or an international equivalent—the very body it mandated for suppliers and sat up till August-2024 on the management system accreditation council—is a direct conflict of interest and a FRAUD!.

REFERENCES:

40-Year QA Expert & Boeing Shareholder Daryl Guberman Exposes Alarming Quality Failures in Boeing's Military and Commercial Aircraft https://www.prlog.org/13093473-40-year-qa-expert-boeing-shareholder-daryl-guberman-exposes-alarming-quality-failures-in-boeings-military-and-commercial-aircraft.html

Boarding Your Next Flight? You Might Be Playing Boeing's Deadliest Lottery https://www.prlog.org/13092956-boarding-your-next-flight-you-might-be-playing-boeings-deadliest-lottery.html

"Boeing's 22-Year-264 months & 8,036 days: Certification Monopoly: 8,300–12,500 Aircraft Flying Without True Independent Inspection" https://www.prlog.org/13092750-boeings-22-year-264-months-8036-days-certification-monopoly-830012500-aircraft-flying-without-true-independent-inspection.html

The Largest Industrial Scam Ever Perpetrated Worldwide Started With Boeing https://www.prlog.org/13092416-the-largest-industrial-scam-ever-perpetrated-worldwide-started-with-boeing.html