Boeing's 22-Year Certification Gap & Doug Ackerman's Boeing VP Of Quality 35-Year Silence: A Quality Oversight Crisis Exposed

EVERETT, Wash. - Aug. 23, 2025 - PRLog -- Boeing's quality oversight has come under renewed scrutiny as a 22-year gap in AS9100 certification coincided with key leadership roles held by Doug Ackerman, a 35-year company veteran. From 2020 to 2024, Ackerman served as Vice President of Supplier Quality, a period in which still Boeing required its suppliers to be AS9100 certified—yet was not certified itself. During this time, Ackerman remained silent on this glaring contradiction, raising questions about internal accountability and external compliance. Ackerman also holds a seat on the Performance Review Institute (PRI) board 2020–Present, responsible for overseeing NADCAP certifications—further entangling Boeing in a network of overlapping interests.

While Doug Ackerman Oversaw the 777 Program: Quality Issues & Whistleblower Testimony

On April 17, 2024, whistleblower Sam Salehpour testified before the U.S. Senate regarding alarming quality problems on Boeing's 777 program, where Ackerman was involved from 2002–2022. Salehpour described forced-fit assemblies leaving structural gaps that could lead to midair failure, production shortcuts jeopardizing long-term airframe integrity, and systemic pressure to overlook defects in pursuit of production targets.World recognized QA Expert and Boeing Shareholder DARYL GUBERMAN  attended the DHS Subcommittee Whistleblower Meeting concerning Boeing's deeply concerning quality practices       https://www.newstribune.com/photos/2024/apr/18/3749044/.

Table 1 — Boeing's Conflict of Interest at a Glance

Entity	Role	Conflict
Boeing	Non-AS9100 certified aerospace giant (2002–2024)	Sat on ANSI–ANAB MSAC with certification powers
ANSI–ANAB MSAC	Management System Accreditation Council managing AS9100 certifications	Listed Boeing as a council member that can grant, suspend and withdraw certification
Boeing Suppliers	Forced to obtain AS9100 via ANSI–ANAB accreditation	Unequal application of standards

Reason Why:

A)     Nineteen days after 911 Boeing came out with a notification to lay off 20,000 to 30,000 employees.

1) April 2002 Supplier Bulletin Performance Review Institute NADCAP National Aerospace and Defense Contractors Accreditation Program certification (HEAT TREATMENT, WELDING, Non-destructive testing- CRITICAL FLIGHT SAFETY INSPECTION) Suppliers were instructed to send in their certificates and parts, with on-site audits only if need arises

2) July 2002 Supplier Bulletin: AS9100 Certification must be ANSI–ANAB Accredited Suppliers were instructed to send in their certificates and parts, with on-site audits only if the need be.

Boeing's Confession on On-Site Supplier Audits

Boeing's procedures explicitly state: "Our preference is to deal with proven suppliers with excellent quality performance and not have to do on-site quality system surveys" (survey is no more than an audit). This is a confession that Boeing rarely stepped into supplier facilities unless necessary. For 22 years, Boeing relied on AS9100 or similar NADCAP certifications, accepting certificates and parts without on-site verification.

ATTENTION READER WHAT DOES: If Need Arises Or If Need Be means?

3) Boeing called ANSI–ANAB out on Supplier Portal or international equivalent (China, Iran, Pakistan equivalent to ANSI-ANAB ACCREDITATION)

4) ANSI–ANAB Website: Management System Accreditation Council (MSAC) (grant, suspend, or withdraw certification) Boeing sat as member on the MSAC webpage { How could Boeing grant, suspend and withdraw certification when they were not certified themselves?!

5) Boeing pursuing AS9100 certification now from ANSI–ANAB—the very body it mandated for suppliers July 2002 and sits on the Management System Accreditation Council (MSAC)—is a direct conflict of interest and a fraud. Leveraging international accreditation's under ILAC or IAF to validate decades of self-declared compliance is fraudulent. International Accreditation Forum incorporated in Delaware (ANSI -ANAB founded the IAF) IAF sister organization in Australia are associations of national and international accreditation bodies equivalent in accreditation to ANSI-ANAB who are also underwriters for IAF/ILAC meaning they are subjected legally to systematic and product failure responsibility for IAF and ILAC members.

Subject to oversight Boeing did not follow

Table 2 — Critical AS9100 Failures Leading to Aircraft Risk, Potential Crash

AS9100 Clause	Requirement	Boeing's Failure	Potential Aircraft Risk
7.1.5 Monitoring & Measurement Resources	Calibrate tools for precision manufacturing.	Relied solely on supplier paperwork without independent verification.	Fatigue-critical components may fail mid-flight.
8.4.2 Control of External Providers	Mandates supplier oversight and audits.	Accepted certificates without on-site inspection.	Components of unknown origin or improper heat treatment.
8.5.1 Control of Production & Service Provision	Enforce welding, heat treatment, and NDT processes.	Failed to validate special process compliance (e.g., NADCAP).	Weld or material failure in critical systems.
9.2 Internal Audit	Conduct routine internal audits.	Audits non-existent or unrecognized by employees.	Defects remain undetected, escalating fleet-wide.
10.2 Nonconformity & Corrective Action	Identify and fix defects systematically.	No certified QMS to enforce corrections.	Latent flaws may result in catastrophic incidents.

Table 3 — Boeing Quality Failures Timeline (2002–2024)

Issue / Time Period	Details	Potential Risk to Aircraft
2002 (Suppler NADCAP) (Supplier AS9100)-	Boeing demanded certification from suppliers despite not holding it itself.	Risk of uncertified parts entering production.
2009 (ODA Adoption) Began 2005 Important***	Boeing began self-certifying under FAA's ODA program. By 2018 Boeing was certifying 96% of its own work.	Reduced external oversight of design and safety certifications.
2020–Present (Ackerman)	Ackerman oversaw Supplier Quality; on-site audits were minimized.	Increased reliance on paperwork, potential for errors or substandard parts.
2022–Present (PRI Board)	Ackerman joined PRI's board overseeing NADCAP standards.	Overlap of Boeing management and certification processes.
June 2024 (Certification)	Boeing finally is willing to obtained AS9100 certification after 22 years. Elizabeth Lund VP June 2024 (Retired December 2024)	Indicates long-term internal non-compliance with supplier expectations.

*** 2018-2019 MCAS system caused 2 fatal crashes Ethiopian and Indonesian flights killing 346 passengers.

Expert Findings by DARYL GUBERMAN

In October 2024, World recognized QA Expert and Boeing Shareholder DARYL GUBERMAN conducted an independent investigation across Boeing facilities in Washington State: Everett, Auburn, Renton, and Northfield. Employees were unaware of AS9100 standards and internal audit procedures, exposing a culture of compliance neglect. Elizabeth Lund, then VP of Quality, admitted in June 2024 that Boeing was only then "willing to obtain AS9100 certification"(after 22 years of Boeings neglect)—a tacit acknowledgment of decades of evasion.

Conclusion

Doug Ackerman's 35 years at Boeing, including his critical 2020–2024 Supplier Quality tenure, reveal systemic quality failures. His silence on the AS9100 gap, coupled with his position on the PRI/NADCAP board, underscores an era where certification was treated as paperwork rather than protection—placing passenger safety, supplier credibility, and aviation trust at significant risk.