Boeing's 22-Year Certification Delinquency: Airlines May Have Received Aircraft Built Without Verifiable Quality Standards"

EVERETT, Wash. - Sept. 21, 2025 - PRLog -- DARYL GUBERMAN, Recognized Quality Expert and Boeing Shareholder, Exposes Systemic Aerospace Quality Failures and Boeing's Certification Gap

In the aftermath of 9/11, when Boeing faced plans to lay off 20,000–30,000 employees, the company implemented changes in supplier oversight that would profoundly impact the aerospace industry for decades.

April and July 2002: The Shift to Certificate-Based Compliance

Boeing eliminated on-site audits at suppliers, replacing them with a "send your certificate, send your parts" system. Suppliers were told that, Boeing would only visit if need be or need arises. Boeing would rely entirely on certification documentation to verify compliance, eliminating what Boeing labeled as "redundant inspections". The practical effect: suppliers could bag-and-tag parts for delivery, while Boeing assumed compliance without independent verification of critical processes such as heat treatment, welding, or other specialized manufacturing.

Example: Imagine a bakery delivering cakes without a health inspector ever checking the ovens or ingredients — they just show a certificate saying the cakes are safe. That's what happened with airplane parts.

Boeing's Lack of AS9100 Certification and Airline Impact
Shockingly, Boeing itself was not AS9100 certified for over 22 years, yet demanded that its suppliers comply strictly with AS9100 standards. This created a system where suppliers were rigorously inspected and certified, while Boeing itself had no verified quality certification, effectively passing potentially substandard aircraft onto airlines.
Airlines that may be affected include Delta, American, United, Southwest, JetBlue, Air India, Emirates, Lufthansa, and Singapore Airlines, and more, all of which purchased planes under the assumption of fully verified quality.

Why this is critical: Even though all suppliers were AS9100 certified, once their parts were delivered to Boeing — an uncertified organization for over 22 years! — the assembly, integration, and final inspection processes were not independently verified. This means that critical components could be improperly installed, misaligned, or inadequately tested, creating potential risks to safety, reliability, and performance.

Example: Imagine a puzzle where each piece was carefully crafted by different experts. Even if each piece is perfect, if the person putting the puzzle together doesn't follow the correct process, the final picture may be incomplete or unstable. In this case, the "puzzle assembler" was Boeing itself — uncertified and unverified — putting certified parts together without independent oversight.

October 29, 2003: Heads Up 22 and IAQG Control

The ANSI–RAB National Accreditation Program (NAP) (which is ANSI-ANAB) issued Heads Up 22, codifying oversight consistency for certification bodies and auditors. At that time, Boeing was the spearhead company within the International Aerospace Quality Group (IAQG), controlling approximately 65% of the consortium's influence. This dominance allowed Boeing to steer global aerospace quality standards while other primes such as Airbus, Lockheed Martin, Rolls-Royce, and Pratt & Whitney played a supporting role.

The OASIS (Online Aerospace Supplier Information System) database was created to track supplier compliance. Suppliers refusing to join or pay database fees risked having their certification revoked, effectively barring them from the aerospace supply chain. This system allowed Boeing to verify compliance entirely via database and documentation, eliminating the need for on-site audits.

Example: It's like a school saying, "Show us your report card online, or you can't attend class," but no one checks if the grades are real.

Federal Agency Involvement and Corporate Oversight

The aerospace quality system was heavily influenced by federal and corporate oversight embedded within the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the American National Accreditation Board (ANAB). Both federal agencies and major corporations sat on these boards — including:

Corporations:

• Boeing
• Lockheed Martin
• Pfizer
• Johnson & Johnson

Federal Agencies:

• Department of Justice (DOJ)
• Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
• Department of Commerce (DOC) / NIST
• Food and Drug Administration (FDA)

These organizations & federal agencies are not just members, but also customers, creating overlapping interests between regulatory oversight and commercial advantage.

ANSI and ANAB are also the founders of the International Accreditation Forum, Inc. (IAF) in Delaware, with their sister organization, the International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation (ILAC) in Australia. Both IAF and ILAC serve as associations of national and international accreditation bodies, equivalent in legal and technical authority to ANSI–ANAB. Additionally, ANSI–ANAB acts as an underwriter for IAF and ILAC, assuming full legal responsibility for systematic and product failures under the accreditation frameworks.

Who Oversees ANSI–ANAB's Work? https://www.prlog.org/13098105-who-oversees-ansianabs-work.html

In 2018, ANSI formally took over complete control of ANAB, though this was largely cosmetic. ANSI always maintained effective control over ANAB; the public and suppliers were simply given the impression that ANAB had become a "new company," while ANSI kept the names separate but authority and influence fully intact.

Example: It's like a parent owning a company but telling everyone a "new CEO" is running it — the parent still makes all the decisions behind the scenes.

Tim Lee and Certification Oversight

Tim Lee, Boeing's representative on the IAQG Other Party Management Team (OPMT) and ANSI–ANAB Management System Accreditation Committee, played a pivotal role in granting, suspending, or withdrawing supplier certifications, cementing Boeing's influence over supplier compliance from the inception of Heads Up 22 onward.

Ask the general public: How could Boeing have an employee on the committee responsible for granting, suspending, and withdrawing certifications, while Boeing itself was not AS9100 certified for over 22 years? Tim Lee was the spearhead representing Boeing in this process. Despite his expertise in quality, he failed to ensure his own company complied, and Boeing remained silent. The appearance is clear — Tim Lee and Boeing were effectively colluding with ANSI-ANAB, allowing Boeing to maintain influence over supplier certification while avoiding accountability for its own compliance failures.

Example: It's like a referee in a sports league who is also the coach of one of the teams — they are supposed to enforce the rules, but they end up bending them for their own team.

Impact on Airlines and the Flying Public

Airlines — including Delta, American, United, Southwest, JetBlue, Air India, Emirates, Lufthansa, and Singapore Airlines — may be affected due to reliance on supplier certificates rather than independent verification. Critical aircraft components may have been produced under unverified processes, leaving potential risks to safety, reliability, and performance.

Example: It's like buying a toy that says "safety tested," but no one actually checked for small parts that could be a choking hazard — except now it's an airplane.

Attention: Manufacturers & Flying Public 8,000–12,000 Boeing Aircraft At Risk! https://www.prlog.org/13097782-attention-manufacturers-flying-public-800012000-boeing-aircraft-at-risk.html#

"Boeing International Film: The Shields of Death – Exposing Decades of Uncertified Corruption."  https://youtu.be/zweWbsIGc7o



Conclusion

DARYL GUBERMAN, recognized quality expert and Boeing shareholder, has exposed what is arguably the LARGEST INDUSTRIAL QUALITY CONTROL SCAM in aerospace history, affecting not only the United States but the global aerospace industry. Boeing's 22-year AS 9100 certification delinquency, combined with supplier reliance, federal board involvement, OASIS oversight, and IAQG dominance, created systemic risk across the worldwide aerospace supply chain. Suppliers, subcontractors, airlines — including Delta, American, United, Southwest, JetBlue, Air India, Emirates, Lufthansa, and Singapore Airlines — and most importantly passengers, may be affected by this unprecedented failure of quality control.

Daryl Guberman is a 40 year, recognized quality assurance expert & Boeing shareholder stood before the DHS Subcommittee on April 17, 2024, advocating for transparency and aviation safety on behalf of 4.7 billion passengers worldwide.
https://www.newstribune.com/photos/2024/apr/18/3749044/