What Do We Know About The World Now?

Dec. 24, 2010 - PRLog -- Leaving aside those leaked cables which reveal U.S. national security vulnerabilities, the diplomatic cables disseminated by worldwide media outlets to date reveal unhedged analysis of numerous nation-states’ development, straight-talk about their diplomatic representatives and, of course, back-room only opinions on their leaders, most of whom are  publicly addressed by American heads of state in quite different tones.  

The following explores a diversity of international political topics which have surfaced through the leaked cables thus far.  The cables, candid as they, present a refreshing view of the world from a realpolitik perspective.  

AFGHANISTAN

Cables revealed that U.S. officials are fully aware of Afghanistan’s corruption, and its permeation from President Hamid Karzai’s office down to provincial governors and beyond. In a December 27, 2009 cable, the U.S. Embassy privately accused Paktia Governor Khan Hamdrad  of arresting contractors  and premising their release upon a bribe.  Hamdrad then funneled some of the bribe money to local insurgent groups, which the Embassy noted as “actively undermining the Afghan’s counterinsurgency policy.”  

The Afghan hawala system – an honor based means of money transfer – facilitates  money conveyances for bribes and narco-trafficking, for example.  By paying a small commission, a person in one city can deposit money at one hawala with instruction for its disposition at another hawala, and little to no accounting  for the monies is required at either location.  

In a single day leading up to the Afghani presidential election in July 2010, transfers totaling USD 75-million were purportedly made from Afghanistan to Dubai, U.A.E.  Dubai frequently serves as a financial safe haven or back-up residence for state bureaucrats and leaders in unstable parts of the subcontinent, southwest Asia and the Middle East.  

Around the same time, then-Afghan Vice-President Ahmad Zia Massoon entered U.A.E. with USD 52-million cash.  He was not required to reveal the source or final destination of the cash and retained it almost in its entirety.  Total, in a period of three and one half years, the Afghan Finance minister reported earlier this year that approximately USD 4.2 billion had been transferred out of Afghanistan through its Kabul airport halawa, alone.  

In other cables, the U.S. Ambassador noted that President Karzai to be “insecure” and a “paranoid and weak individual.” He continued, “Indeed his inability to grasp the most rudimentary principles of state-building and his deep seated insecurity as a leader combine to make any admission of fault unlikely, in turn confounding our best efforts to find in kind a responsible partner.”  
   
In response to these cable, one pundit stated that the U.S. must take this opportunity to distance itself from Karzai, and even begin to threaten to publicly call him out on his poor leadership.  Contemporaneously, the U.S. must develop a moderate leader with the wherewithal to confront corruption in Afghanistan— not benefit from it.  The U.S. must deploy its own resources to balance those of Karzai’s corrupt aristocracy, and demonstrate to Afghanis that democracy is in fact better than rule by the Taliban.  To date, Afghani’s cannot be blamed if they have not yet bought into Karzai’s illusory democracy.  

SAUDI ARABIA & KUWAIT
   
In March 2010 discussions regarding what to do with Guantanamo bay inmates from Persian Gulf states, Saudi King Abdullah suggested to Obama administration counter-terrorism chief John Brennan that the U.S. “implant[] detainees with an electronic chip containing information about them and allowing their movements to be tracked with Bluetooth,” one cable stated, “This was done with horses and falcons.”  Brennan replied, “Horses don’t have good lawyers” and explained the legal obstructions to such a proposal.  

The cables reveals perplexity faced by Middle Eastern states in dealing with insurgents that would-be  returned to their native lands under the proposed Guantanamo closure.  Recall, many Iraqi and Afghani insurgents emigrated from other nations to carry out jihad in those countries.  

In a February 2009 meeting Kuwait’s Interior Minister implored the U.S. Ambassador, “You know better than I that we cannot deal with these people.  I can’t detain them . . . If they are rotten, they are rotten and the best thing to do is get rid of them.  You picked them up in Afghanistan; you should drop them off in Afghanistan, in the middle of the war zone.”

Kuwait’s concerns were not meritless.  On November 3, 2005, one Abdullah al-Ajmi (Internment Serial No. 220) was repatriated to Kuwait from Guantanamo Bay.  There, he was acquitted on all charges.  In April 2008, according to the Defense Intelligence Agency, Al-Ajmi carried out a suicide attack in Iraq which killed seven people.  Fingerprints collected from a dismembered hand matched up to those recorded off Al-Ajmi at Guantanamo Bay.    

YEMEN

Two cables in particular appear to pose the greatest threat of stirring up the leadership of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).  That branch of the terrorist group is most notorious for the recently attempted cargo-bombing and Christmas-day underwear bomb on U.S.-bound airplanes.  

One cable from January 2010 evidences U.S. General David Petraeus and Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh discussion regarding a recent airstrike on AQAP in Yemen, which unintentionally brought about civilian collateral damage.  The Yemeni government carried out the airstrike according to public reports.  During their conversation, Saleh is quoted as saying to Petraeus, “We’ll continue saying the bombs are ours, not yours.”  The cable also reports that Saleh’s aid interrupted with a joke about Saleh lying to his own parliament about the air assault.  

In a second cable, summarizing an exchange between Saleh and Brennan,  Saleh expresses his concern regarding the illegal flow of drugs and weapons from neighboring Djibouti, but not whiskey, “provided it’s good whiskey.”  Islam forbids the consumption of alcohol.  In 2009, AQAP executed a Yemeni government official who they discovered had smuggled whiskey into Yemen.  

RUSSIA

State Department cables reveal pervasive corruption in Russia, and also the adeptness of U.S. diplomatic analytical capabilities. The wires describe a “three-tiered structure” in Moscow’s crime circuit with (i) the Mayor at the top, (ii) the police and intelligence officials at the second tier, (iii) and “ordinary criminals and corrupt inspectors” at the bottom.  

“Moscow business owners understand that it is best to get protection from the MVD [Interior Ministery] and FSB [federal intelligence service] (rather than organized crime groups) since they not only have more guns, resources and power than criminal groups, but they are also protected by the law.”  One cable noted that organized crime groups are no longer in high demand.

Diplomatic correspondence also documented the then mayor of Moscow, Yuri M. Luzhkov’s growing influence and corruption.  On the one hand, the Mayor provided a larger base for the ruling party, chaired by President Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.  On the other hand, The New York Times reports that his corruption “was so profligate that witnesses saw suitcases, presumably full of cash, being carried into the Kremlin under guard.”  

One note from the U.S. Embassy concluded, “Ultimately, the tandem [Medvedev and Putin] will put Luzhkov out to pasture.”  Shortly thereafter, President Medvedev dismissed Luzhkov from his post.  Other cables described rumors in the presidential administration regarding P.M. Putin’s loss of control, estimating that approximately  60 percent of his orders were not being followed by subordinates.  

U.K. ...
NIGERIA ...
TURKEY AND ISRAEL ...

By Zein E. Obagi, Jr. | Legal Columnist

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