The Global Collapse Of Certification: How A 2018 Federal Contract Breach Contaminated Every Industry And Invalidated All Audits & Certifications

WASHINGTON - Aug. 6, 2026 - PRLog -- For forty years I've worked inside quality systems, and I've seen failures that cost money, failures that cost time, and failures that cost reputations. But nothing compares to the collapse that began with the U.S. Department of State contract 19AQMM18R0131 in 2018 when ANAB-American National Accreditation Board (owned by ANSI-American National Standards Institute) was called out as an "underwriter". An accreditation body cannot be a underwriter. That single breach didn't just affect one supplier or one certificate — it contaminated the entire accreditation chain tied to ANAB and every international body connected through multi‑regional, lateral‑agreement equivalence. And because those accreditation networks touch nearly every sector, the contamination spread far beyond aerospace.https://www.prlog.org/13132182-the-guberman-anomaly-25-year-forensic-record-exposing-structural-failures-in-global-accreditation-and-us-oversight.html

This isn't speculation. It's documented across multiple published releases:

Evidence Article #1:

https://www.prlog.org/13162883-the-anab-integrity-breach-multi-industry-contamination-no-one-detected-until-40-year-quality-expert-boeing-shareholder-daryl-guberman-did.html

In that release, I wrote:

"The contamination spread because ANAB's accreditation was treated as the global standard."

That contamination didn't stay in aerospace — it spread into defense, medical devices, pharmaceuticals, electronics, automotive, energy, laboratories, food safety, logistics, and dozens of other sectors.

Evidence Article #2:

https://www.prlog.org/13160005-the-real-story-america-commercial-and-military-is-flying-on-suspected-unapproved-parts.html

In that investigation, I warned:

"When certification collapses, traceability collapses with it."

That collapse didn't stop at aircraft parts. It affected every material, every process, and every supplier operating under ANAB or its international equivalents after September 4, 2018.

Evidence Article #3:

https://www.prlog.org/13160673-attention-suppliers-of-aerospace-materials-all-industries-worldwide-your-iso-as-ai-certificates-are-fraudulent-from-2018-to-present.html

In that release, I documented the truth most companies still don't understand:

"Every certificate issued under ANAB or its MRA-MLA (Multi-Regional-Lateral Agreement)- international accreditation, partners after September 4, 2018  is invalid."

Once the fraud occurred, the accreditation foundation collapsed. From September 4, 2018 to the present day, every certification audit, surveillance audit, and recertification performed by ANAB‑accredited registrars — and by any international registrars accredited by MRA-MLA  recognized as "equivalent" — became invalid. Not questionable. Not partially acceptable-Invalid.
There is no waiver, no exception, and no administrative workaround when the foundation itself is flawed or fraudulent.

And here's the part no one wants to talk about:

The materials you are building with inside a fraudulent environment are no good — from the original manufacturer all the way through the entire process.

You don't know what the material actually is. You don't know whether the supplier followed the right controls. You don't know whether the traceability is real. You don't know whether the testing was valid. And you don't know whether the auditor who approved your system had any legitimate authority to do so.

Your registrar — ANAB‑accredited or internationally equivalent — never knew about the fraud, only some of ANAB's upper management knew. The auditor who walked into your business didn't know either. But the moment they performed an audit under a fraudulent accreditation chain, they unknowingly perpetrated a fraud on your business. They didn't intend to. They didn't plan to. But they did — because the accreditation system they relied on had already collapsed. https://www.prlog.org/13142888-2018present-anabs-structural-failures-outdated-designation-undermine-certification-integrity-across-useuropean-asian-global-supply-chains.html

In March 2014, I personally received a letter from the Vice President of ANAB and the Chairman of the IAF. They stated clearly that the MRA — the multi‑regional and lateral agreement — made all international accreditation bodies "equivalent" to ANAB. Their exact assurance was:

"Certified once, accepted everywhere."

That phrase was meant to build trust. Instead, it guaranteed global contamination. Because when ANAB perpetrated fraud, every certificate tied to that equivalence became contaminated. The truth today is the opposite of what they promised:

"Certified once, REJECTED everywhere".

I've watched good businesses get hurt because they didn't know the truth. They believed their certificates protected them. They believed their audits proved compliance. They believed their corrective actions closed gaps. But when the accreditation chain is compromised, none of that paperwork holds up. It becomes a liability instead of a shield.Also business owners have a hard time understanding Boeing was not AS9100 certified for 24 years, Here is Boeings confession of Not being certified.June 27, 2024: Miss Elizabeth Lund, Boeing's Vice President of Quality, told Reuters that Boeing was "willing and prepared" to get AS9100, that they were "compliant," and that they were "doing internal audits as if they were certified."https://uk.finance.yahoo.com/news/boeing-brief-european-regulators-production-090603535.html ( Last paragraph in this article "willing and prepared")

October 2024: I personally went to Washington State: Everett, Renton, Auburn, and Northfield. I discovered she was not telling the truth.

No one knew about AS9100.

No one knew about internal auditing.

And when employees were asked to attend a meeting, their bosses said:
"No — the plane has to move to the next station."

Customers,consumers, investors, insurers, logistics, regulators worldwide deserve to know whether the products they rely on were built under valid oversight. Regulators deserve to know whether the systems they approved were supported by legitimate accreditation. And suppliers deserve to know that they were operating inside a system that failed them — not the other way around.

This release is not theory. It is not rumor. It is documented across multiple published investigations. The  ANAB "underwriter" fraud tied to the DOS contract 19AQMM18R0131 didn't just break one link in the chain — it broke the entire chain. And because that chain touches every major industry, the contamination is global.

If your certification, audit, or corrective action came from ANAB or its international equivalents after September 4, 2018, you need to take a hard look at your quality system. The risk isn't hidden anymore. It's right out in the open. Those who got to this part of the press release must now understand industries worldwide are still producing materials in a FRAUDULENT environment!

From 2018 to present, when the accreditation system collapsed, every industry collapsed with it — because no business, no insurer, no investor, no supply chain, and no nation can survive when the truth is that nothing built under fraudulent certification can be trusted.

– 2026 DARYL GUBERMAN