Guberman Alerts DGCA: Boeing's 2014-Built Aircraft Are 'SUP' Due To Systemic Accreditation Fraud And Failure To Maintain Quality Certification

WASHINGTON - May 26, 2026 - PRLog -- Daryl Guberman, CEO of Guberman PMC,LLC and a 40-year quality systems specialist & Boeing shareholder is issuing an urgent technical briefing to the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (India) regarding the 2014-built 787 and the broader airworthiness of the Boeing fleet. Guberman asserts that the DGCA cannot legally or technically conclude its investigation as "pilot error" or a "component failure," because the true root cause lies in the uncertified manufacturing system itself.

The 'Certification vs. Compliance' Mandate

Guberman emphasizes that in aerospace, "compliance" is merely a suggestion, but Certification is a mandate. A valid quality certification requires a two-pronged audit structure: Rigorous Internal/Supplier Audits and Third-Party Audits.

"You cannot have a certified system if you only do half the work," says Guberman. "Boeing's 2002 shift away from mandatory on-site supplier audits to a paper-based system—where suppliers simply mail in a certificate and a part—is a total abdication of quality responsibility. This 'passive oversight' stripped them of their certified status and rendered them merely 'Self-Compliant,' a direct violation of aerospace manufacturing law."

Airworthiness vs. AS9100: Why DGCA Cannot Rely on Laboratory Testing or OEM Narratives

For years, the FAA, EASA, and the ICOP structure have promoted a dangerously misleading doctrine to global regulators—including India, China, Singapore, and others—that an Airworthiness Certificate somehow supersedes or replaces the requirement for a functioning, fully certified AS9100 quality management system.

This is technically false, legally indefensible, and contradicted by the FAA's own published requirements.

FAA's Actual Requirement: A Certified Quality System — Not "Compliance" There is no waiver, no exception, and no administrative workaround when the foundation itself is fraudulent or missing."

The FAA has repeatedly stated that a manufacturer must operate under a quality system, not a "compliance system," and certainly not a "self‑attested" system. A certified system requires:

• documented internal audits
• supplier audits and verification at the source
• traceable records
• objective evidence of conformity

When Boeing abandoned mandatory supplier audits in 2002 and shifted to a paper‑based "mail‑in" system, they forfeited their ability to claim AS9100 certification. What remained was self‑compliance, which is not recognized under FAA, EASA, or AS9100 rules.

Yet global regulators were told—wrongly—that an Airworthiness Certificate could be trusted even when the underlying AS9100 system had collapsed.

The ICOP/FAA/EASA Sales Pitch to Global Regulators

Through ICOP and the accreditation bodies, regulators were sold a bill of goods:

• "Don't worry about AS9100, the aircraft is airworthy."
• "Airworthiness supersedes the process standard."
• "If the FAA/EASA accepted it, you can accept it."

This narrative was convenient for Boeing and the FAA, but it was technically fraudulent. An Airworthiness Certificate is only the final label placed on an aircraft. It is not proof that the manufacturing system was ever certified, audited, or even functioning.

Why DGCA Cannot Rely on Laboratory Testing of the 2014 Switch

Before DGCA finalizes any report, it must recognize that laboratory testing of the 2014 Honeywell toggle switch cannot establish reliability because the system it came from was uncertified.

This is reinforced by the sworn 2017 deposition of Pamela Sale, Vice President of Quality for ANAB's forensic laboratory division, who stated:

"There is no commonly agreed‑upon set of standards that forensic labs around the country have to follow. Instead, there are informal guidelines that labs can choose to follow or not."

If U.S. forensic labs operate without mandatory standards, and Boeing itself had no functioning AS9100 system, then laboratory testing of a 2014/plane crashed 2025 switch cannot provide India with any meaningful assurance of safety or pedigree.

The 2018 DOS Contract: ANAB's Fraudulent Claim of Being an 'Underwriter'

This problem is compounded by the 2018 U.S. Department of State contract 19AQMM18R0131, where ANAB falsely represented itself as an "underwriter" for the IAF and ILAC—a role that does not exist in international accreditation law.

This fraudulent claim contaminated the entire ICOP structure and every certificate tied to ANAB through MRA/MLA agreements.

If Boeing had held a certificate during this period, it would have been fraudulent by definition, because the accreditor itself was operating under false pretenses.

The 2025 Crash Investigation: The True Root Cause

When the Honeywell toggle switch entered the 2014 production line, it was admitted into this unverified, uncertified environment. Under the "Root and Fruit" doctrine, that makes the switch, and the 787 aircraft, Suspected Unapproved Parts (SUP).

"The DGCA cannot judge and make a final report on the 787- 2025 crash based on a single switch issue or pilot error," Guberman explains. "The true root cause of the failure is, and was, the system the aircraft was built in. If the entire system used to receive and install that switch was a technical sham, then the investigation must focus on that systemic collapse. As a 40-year quality specialist and a Boeing shareholder, I am telling the DGCA that I would be an asset at the table to ensure a real investigation occurs, rather than having them sit there and listen to the Boeing and FAA BULLSHIT."

Boeing International Film: "The Shields Of Death – Exposing Decades Of Uncertified Corruption" https://youtu.be/zweWbsIGc7o



A Call for Indian Leadership: Protecting the Flying Public

Guberman is advising the DGCA to place their final report on hold for at least 30 days to conduct a forensic review of the internal audit logs.

"Placing this report on hold for a month would be the best business decision the DGCA has ever made," says Guberman. "This isn't just about their organization; it's about the safety of the Indian people who fly on these planes. They deserve a report based on technical truth, not OEM narratives."

Technical Glossary: Defining the Systemic Failure

• SUP (Suspected Unapproved Parts): Any part or material that lacks a verifiable pedigree or was produced outside a certified quality system. If an OEM fails to maintain internal audit records, the parts—and the aircraft—are technically classified as SUP.
  
  
• MRA (Mutual Recognition Agreement) & MLA (Multilateral Agreement): International treaties that mandate accreditation bodies (like ANAB in the U.S.) are equivalent to their global counterparts.
  
  
• The Contamination: Because these bodies are legally tethered as "equivalents," the 2018 ANAB fraud contaminated the entire worldwide quality system. Every accreditation body tied to ANAB through MRA/MLA agreements was forced to accept fraudulent data as "certified," poisoning the global aerospace supply chain.

         EASA- European Union Aviation Safety Agency
The International Aerospace Quality Group (IAQG)          Industry Controlled Other Party (ICOP)

Urgent Call for DGCA: Demand 2014 Internal Audit Logs

Guberman is calling on the DGCA to immediately demand Boeing's internal audit logs specifically for the 2014 production run.

"The DGCA must ask Boeing for their actual quality certification records today. If they cannot produce the 2014 internal audit logs to prove the Honeywell switch was physically verified at the source—not just 'mailed in'—then their airworthiness claim is void. A signature from a third-party registrar is meaningless if the internal audit records are missing or were never performed."

"Neglect Is The Silent Architect Of Collapse, And It Always Collects Its Debt."
— DARYL GUBERMAN