Production Expansion Without Certified Quality Oversight Raises Systemic Aerospace Safety Concerns

EVERETT, Wash. - Feb. 11, 2026 - PRLog -- "U.S. Planemaker Boeing Plans to Open Fourth 737 Production Line in Midsummer," published February 10, 2026 https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/boeing...

Introduction

This statement addresses widespread concerns regarding Boeing's quality management system certification following reports of expanded 737 production capacity. While Reuters' February 10 article emphasized workforce announcements and line extensions, it did not address the broader issue of quality assurance oversight that underpins this expansion.

Industry Standard AS9100 / IA9100 and Third Party Certification

AS9100 (and its latest revision, IA9100) is the internationally accepted aerospace quality management standard, derived from ISO 9001 and tailored specifically for aircraft design and production. Though not mandated by FAA regulation, AS9100 has become the global baseline for demonstrating quality integrity in aerospace manufacturing.

The reason it remains non mandatory is structural: both Boeing and the FAA hold seats on the ANSI American National Standards Institute,ANAB American National Accreditation Board,(ANSI took over 100% control ANAB in 2018) and related oversight committees involved in U.S. accreditation governance. Their participation helps preserve AS9100's "voluntary" regulatory status even as it functions as a contractual obligation across nearly all tiers of the global aerospace supply chain.

To achieve AS9100/IA9100 certification, a company must:

• Establish and document its quality management system.
• Undergo third party audits by an accredited, independent certification body.
• Demonstrate ongoing compliance through surveillance and recertification audits.

Certification bodies themselves must be accredited by oversight organizations such as ANAB, following globally accepted conformity assessment standards.

LATENT FAILURE BY DESIGN: "HOW TRUST BUT DON'T VERIFY" Is Boeing's Quality Initiative 2002-2026 https://youtu.be/yJO9at_tsPs



Clauses Requiring Independent Verification

Key AS9100/IA9100 clauses subject to mandatory external audit include:

• Clause 4 - Quality Management System Requirements.
• Clause 5 - Leadership and Management Commitment.
• Clause 8.4 - Control of Externally Provided Processes, Products, and Services.
• Clause 9.2 - Internal Audits and Verification Records.
• Clause 9.3 - Management Review.
• Clause 10.2 - Nonconformity and Corrective Actions.

Without independent verification of these clauses, certification cannot be achieved or validated - leaving a manufacturer without proven quality oversight. Boeing should never have built planes.

Boeing's Certification Status and Oversight Role

Despite requiring AS9100 certification from its suppliers, Boeing has not maintained company wide AS9100/IA9100 certification across its commercial airplane operations for decades. From 2014 to 2024, Boeing representation sat on the
ANAB Management System Accreditation Committee, the very body responsible granting, suspending and withdrawing certifications.

This overlap - being both an influenced entity and a policy participant - creates an inherent conflict of interest that undermines the independence of quality oversight.

FAA Delegation and Oversight Blurring

Since 2009, under the Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) framework, the FAA delegated significant authority to Boeing employees to perform certification and compliance tasks traditionally handled by FAA inspectors.

Combined with Boeing's absence of company wide third party certification AS9100-IA9100, this delegation has blurred the lines between regulated compliance and corporate self approval - notably weakening the intended safeguards within aerospace oversight.

The 2002 Supplier Requirements and Oversight Contradiction

Boeing's internal supplier policies reveal a major inconsistency in how quality assurance was enforced.

• April 2002: Boeing mandated that suppliers performing heat treatment, welding, flight critical operations, and non destructive testing (NDT) obtain NADCAP National Aerospace and Defense Contractors Accreditation Program certification.
• July 2002: Boeing followed with a directive requiring all suppliers to hold AS9100 certification through ANAB accredited registrars.

In both cases, Boeing enforced these external standards on suppliers while not maintaining equivalent certifications or third party audits of its own systems and suppliers. At the same time, Boeing's participation in ANAB governance meant it held influence over the accreditation framework that suppliers were required to comply with - a systemic contradiction that calls into question impartiality within the aerospace quality network.

Public Statements and Verification Visits

In a June 27, 2024 Reuters interview, Boeing Vice President of Quality Elizabeth Lund asserted that Boeing "was willing and prepared to get AS9100" and "performs internal audits as if certified."

However, in October 2024, quality expert Daryl Guberman personally conducted on site reviews of Boeing's Everett, Renton, Auburn, and Northfield facilities. His findings revealed no evidence of company wide AS9100/IA9100 certification or employee familiarity with certification processes.

Guberman's investigation confirmed that Boeing had operated for over two decades without externally verified quality oversight - a fact "NOT" reported in media or official inquiries!!

Systemic Implications

While U.S. law does not compel AS9100/IA9100 certification, its absence at a major manufacturer BOEING directly involved in its governance compromises both domestic and international trust. The joint roles of Boeing and the FAA within ANSI and ANAB governance help explain why AS9100 remains "optional," despite being treated as essential by nearly every other aerospace entity worldwide.

Such structural overlap erodes the firewall between producer and regulator, threatening the objectivity and reliability of aerospace safety compliance on a global scale.

Conclusion

Independent verification through accredited certification is the cornerstone of quality assurance in aviation. Boeing's decades long absence of AS9100/IA9100 certification - combined with its position on accreditation boards, FAA delegated authority, and selective enforcement of NADCAP and AS9100 upon suppliers - represents a system fundamentally out of balance.

Production expansion without verified quality oversight is not progress; it is a warning sign. Boeing should never have continued building aircraft without validated third party certification and full compliance with industry standard quality frameworks. ANSI-ANAB and Boeing have destroyed not just aerospace accredited certification but all industries which are inclusive of their international equivalents.

Safety in the Sky
By Daryl Guberman

They built and they built, till the numbers looked neat,
With lines running fast and more jets on their feet.

But a system's not safe just because it runs wide,
If the roots aren't inspected deep down inside.

You can paint it, expand it, produce by the score-
But quality's truth is the heart of the core.

For a jet in the sky is no toy on a shelf...
It must answer to standards - not certify itself.

© 2.26 Daryl Guberman, 40 Year Quality Expert & Boeing shareholder