EVERETT, Wash. - Sept. 7, 2025 - PRLog -- President Donald Trump recently criticized Boeing for delays in delivering the new Air Force One aircraft, stating he is "not happy with Boeing" and is "looking at alternatives" due to prolonged production timelines. While Trump focused on schedule delays, a recognized 40-year quality assurance expert and Boeing shareholder, Daryl Guberman, warns that Boeing's failures run far deeper: the company operated uncertified (AS 9100 International Standard For Aerospace) for 22 years, potentially compromising 8,000–12,000 aircraft and millions of passengers worldwide.
Trump Quote: "I'm not happy with Boeing… looking at alternatives" — Donald Trump, Feb 2025
June 18, 2024 Washington D.C. Meeting: David Calhoun-CEO of Boeing at the time. His understanding of his Boeing leadership was superficial — like hitting golf balls off the tee. As a shareholder, Daryl Guberman witnessed- systemic risk & potential aircraft failure-(CRASH).
Guberman Findings: Spent almost entire month of October 2024 with striking Boeing workers IAM 751 in Renton, Auburn, Everett, Northfield. Witnessed lack of quality oversight, inadequate management, disengaged leadership.
April 2, 2025 Washington D.C. Meeting : DARYL GUBERMAN showed up at Kelly Ortberg 's-CEO of Boeing, questioning by Ted Cruz and Maria Cantwell in Washington, D.C. A week before the meeting, GUBERMAN submitted a document to Ted Cruz detailing Boeing's timeline of indiscretions—the Boeing disaster timeline. It appeared that Ted Cruz ignored it. GUBERMAN felt that after questioning began, Ortberg had received a scripted questionnaire that both Cruz and Cantwell could not deviate from, having been at two prior Washington meetings. GUBERMAN thought something did not smell right.
October 2024 – Washington State: Everett, Auburn, Renton, and Northfield
DARYL GUBERMAN's Analysis
Category
Expected Standard (AS9100)
Observed Reality at Boeing (2002–2024)
Internal Audits
Regular, documented audits with corrective actions
Audits only "if need arises, or need be" major gaps in compliance
Workforce Experience
Majority with 10+ years in aerospace roles
75% had only 3–5 years, critical knowledge missing. 25% have 10 years or more
Supplier Oversight
NEVER Monitored under ANSI–ANAB accreditation
Suppliers forced compliant; Boeing itself uncertified
Leadership Accountability
Executive involvement in quality decisions
Leadership disengaged; superficial understanding
Safety Reporting
Documented, actionable incident reports
Inconsistent reporting, systemic failures ignored
Compliance Documentation
Accurate, complete, verified records
Records incomplete or falsified, risk to certification credibility
Key Metrics – Chart 1
Date / Year
Event / Action
Details / Notes
Sep 19, 2001
Boeing layoffs
20,000–30,000 employees laid off following 9/11
Apr 2002
NADCAP Certification
NADCAP for special processes: heat treatment, welding, non-destructive testing, flight safety inspections. Replaced on-site audits.
Jul 2002
AS9100 Certification
AS9100 – must be ANSI & ANAB accredited. Boeing called out suppliers on supplier portal & 2002 supplier bulletin. Boeing sat on ANSI-ANAB WEBSITE/WEBPAGE-Management System Accreditation Council which can grant, suspend, withdraw certification despite not being certified. Replaced on-site audits.
Apr–Jul 2002
Inspection Policy
Boeing replaced on-site audits with NADCAP & AS9100 certifications; on-site inspections only "if need arises or need be"
Oct 2003
ANSI–ANAB OASIS- Online Aerospace Information Systems Database-Run By IAQG International Aerospace Quality Group (ANSI-ANAB MEMBER)
Suppliers cannot refuse database inclusion or fees; refusal can result in certificate withdrawal.
2009
Boeing Becomes FAA-Agency
Allowed to self-certify aircraft & technologies (e.g., MCAS). FAA inspectors paid by Boeing. Potentially 8,000–12,000 uncertified aircraft.
2018–2019
MCAS Crashes
Ethiopian & Indonesian crashes killed 300+ people, highlighting consequences of self-certification practices.
Workforce (2002–2024)
Experience Levels
75% of workforce had only 3–5 years' experience; critical knowledge missing
Certification Gap
Uncertified Period
Boeing operated uncertified as 9100 for 22 years, creating systemic risk
*
⚠ Important Note
Sitting on ANSI–ANAB's board are DOJ, DOC, DHS, and FDA—federal agencies that are not just members but paying customers, along with Boeing. These four are only a subset of federal members.
Key Metrics – Chart 2 (Summary of Critical Risks)
Metric
Value / Impact
Potentially Uncertified Aircraft
8,000–12,000
Workforce Experience
75% with only 3–5 years' experience
Uncertified Period
22 years
FAA Self-Certification
Boeing authorized to self-certify aircraft and technologies
Risk to Passengers
Millions potentially exposed to uncertified aircraft
Daryl Guberman has over 40 years of experience in quality assurance, specializing in aerospace, composites, metals, and nuclear industries. He testified before the DHS Subcommittee on April 17, 2024, advocating for transparency and aviation safety on behalf of billions of passengers worldwide. https://www.newstribune.com/photos/2024/apr/18/3749044/
MANUFACTURERS & PASSENGERS ALERT: Boeing Flew Uncertified For 22 Years, Putting Millions At Risk!!!
Account Phone Number