Impeaching Fairfax May Not Be Legal, But It Might Be Best

WASHINGTON - Feb. 9, 2019 - PRLog -- Although one Virginia lawmaker has threatened to introduce articles of impeachment if Lieutenant Governor Justin Fairfax does not step down, it appears that the remedy of impeachment is available only for wrongdoings allegedly committed while an official is in office, notes public interest law professor John Banzhaf.

        However, suggests Banzhaf, an impeachment investigation, including public hearings, might be best for everyone: e.g.,  Professor Vanessa Tyson has said that she would cooperate with such an investigation; the Virginia Republican Party has called for a thorough investigation; it would avoid the awkwardness of prominent Democrats having to call for his resignation without any opportunity for him to effectively refute the charges; and Fairfax himself has demanded one.

        Indeed, in claiming that the charges against him are "demonstrably false," he seemingly suggests that he will be able to disprove them if only he is given an opportunity to do so.  "Demonstrably" is variously defined as capable of being proved, demonstrable incontrovertibly or beyond the possibility of doubt, etc.

        So Fairfax is seemingly promising not just that he will deny the accusations under oath or explain them away; he is asserting that he has clear and incontrovertible proof of his innocence.

        If he in fact has such proof as he claims, it is hard to argue that he should not be able to present it in an appropriate hearing, even if it cannot lead to an impeachment.  Moreover, his words suggest that he would not object to such an investigation, despite having possible legal arguments against it.

        In any event, impeachment of any official in Virginia would appear to be contrary to the clear language of the State's constitution, as well as to national precedent, suggests Banzhaf, who published a similar legal analysis regarding the possibility of impeaching President Trump or Governor Northam.

        Section 17 of Article IV of the Virginia constitution provides that for "offending against the Commonwealth by malfeasance in office, corruption, neglect of duty, or other high crime or misdemeanor [the governor or several other officials] may be impeached by the House of Delegates."

        Several phrases in this standard make it clear that it applies only to actions or inactions during an official's term of office, and in any event would not apply to whatever occurred while Fairfax was a student or shortly thereafter, says Banzhaf.  For example, the constitutional standard for impeachment begins with the phrase "offending against the Commonwealth by . . ."

        This implies that the acts must have occurred while the person was a governmental official, since it hard to see how a private citizen - much less a student - could offend against the state of Virginia.

        In other words, it appears that the phrase "offending against the Commonwealth by . . ." applies to all of the following terms, including "corruption," "high crimes . .," etc.

        Indeed, the very next phrase - "malfeasance in office" - supports that analysis, and likewise also limits the standard for impeachment to acts done "in office."

        Moreover, in determining the meaning of words in a statute, courts rely upon a maxim of construction which says that, where there is a list of items, each and every one should usually be construed to be similar to the others, and not clearly different, unless such intent is made plain from the choice of words.

        So the words "in office" probably should apply to the other impeachment standards as well.

        This construction - that all of the standards for impeachment apply only to actions taken while in office - is strengthened and repeated in another standard: "neglect of duty."  Office holders have a variety of duties, but the concept usually is not applied to ordinary citizens, although technically everyone has a duty not to speed, not to murder, to pay taxes, etc.

        Still another word in Virginia's standard for impeachment is "corruption."

        That word likewise seems to apply to actions taken while a person is holding some kind of office of trust - in the government or non-governmental entity - but not to wrongful sex acts allegedly engaged in long before, and having nothing whatsoever to do with, taking office.

        The final phrase in Virginia's constitutional standard - "high crime or misdemeanor" - would, if standing alone, apply to the alleged sexual wrongdoings, since both would constitute high crimes.

        However, according to the canon of construction noted earlier - that it should be construed in a fashion similar to the other phrases in the impeachment standard - it would apply only to actions taken during his term as attorney general.

        The impeachment language in the Virginia and U.S. constitutions arey are similar, and both probably reflect in different words that the purpose of impeachment is to remove someone who has behaved improperly while in office, and not to punish someone for transgressions alleged to have occurred years before he assumed office.

        While considering his impeachment, the House Judiciary Committee concluded that impeachment "should only be applied to high crimes and misdemeanors committed while in office and which alone affect the officer in discharge of his duties as such, whatever may have been their effect upon him as a man, for impeachment touches the office only and qualifications for the office, and not the man himself."

        A hearing that most (including the accused) seem to favor, where all parties would be able to relate their version of events in detail far greater than in carefully scripted statements by their attorneys, where they would be required to testify under the threat of perjury, and where they would be subject to cross examination is obviously preferable to a trial in the court of public opinion, argues Banzhaf.

http://banzhaf.net/  jbanzhaf3ATgmail.com  @profbanzhaf