Florence Gaub: Joint Arab military force project needs reboot

Oct. 26, 2015 - PRLog -- The project of a joint Arab military force, postponed indefinitely due to dispute between the Arab League states and poorly prepared legal framework, must be rebooted under a different format and with an adjusted set of objectives, concludes Florence Gaub, senior analyst at the European Union Institute for Security Studies, in her article titled “Stuck in the barracks: the Joint Arab Force.”

She reminds that in 2015, the Arab League Secretariat went beyond the previously discussed limited military alliance projects and proposed to establish a counterterrorism-oriented joint Arab rapid intervention force that would fall under the 1950 military defense and economic cooperation pact.

“Egypt’s President [Abdel Fattah] el-Sisi swiftly picked up on this proposal, declaring that ‘the need for a unified Arab force is growing and becoming more pressing every day.’ King Hamad [bin Isa Al Khalifa] of Bahrain backed this call, and the Arab summit in March 2015 endorsed the idea in what its Secretary General [Nabil Elaraby] dubbed a ‘historic development’: a Joint Arab Force (JAF). Alas, in late August it all came to an abrupt halt: Saudi Arabia, with support from other Gulf states, has delayed the next meeting concerning the force’s establishment indefinitely. What went wrong, and is the project doomed?” the analyst asks.

Below “PenzaNews” agency quotes the full text of the article that was translated into Russian for our website.

The features of the force

The announcement of the JAF was met with a large degree of cynicism: perhaps unsurprisingly, given the number of times Arab states had sought to establish such a joint military force in the past. But this time, the common threat of terrorism provided an important glue. The new force’s task was to take on “rapid military intervention missions and other tasks to confront the challenges to the security and safety of any member state that would pose a direct threat to Arab national security, including terrorist organizations.”

Uncharacteristically, the League’s council moved rapidly to first amend the statute of its peace and security council in order to enable its twice yearly meeting at ministerial level (until then, the body created in 2006 had no executive power and consisted of only five rotating members). It also assigned the council the task of preparing strategies to maintain regional peace and security, and to improve Arab security capabilities.

In addition, the summit resolution tasked the Secretary General to coordinate with the Arab chiefs-of-staff regarding the actual implementation of these new provisions. Details about the force were still vague but initial figures mentioned a force of up to 40,000 troops (35,000 ground troops, 5,000 naval forces and 500-1,000 air forces) headquartered in Egypt and commanded by a Saudi general.

Membership of this force was to be on a voluntary basis; it was to have an integrated and permanent command structure much like NATO, with specified warfighting components (air, sea, land and special forces). As in NATO, costs for troops would be covered by the respective member states, whereas the command structure was to be financed by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). It was also envisioned to establish an Arab peacekeeping force made up of military and civilian elements deployed at their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment when necessary.

There were to be four levels of command, two of which would be permanent (the supreme defense council and the council of chiefs-of-staff), whereas the joint general command and the field command were to be appointed on a case-by-case basis. The supreme defense council, already in place, would have its function enhanced. The joint general command was to be headed by a general appointed by the supreme council for two years. He would be assisted by a council of chiefs-of-staff consisting of representatives of all member states. The field commander was to be appointed by the chiefs-of-staff council. This appointment was to be agreed in consultation with the country in question and the commander general.

Assistance from this force could be sought by member states by submitting a request to the Arab League. In the event that the state was unable to make that request, the Secretary General was to be empowered to make it on its behalf. Issues such as a status of forces agreement were still to be finalized. In a series of meetings following the announcements, the Arab states tried to work through the remaining questions, aiming at a final protocol to be handed to the Arab League Council by the end of the summer of 2015.

Full text news agency "PenzaNews":http://penzanews.ru/en/opinion/59791-2015