New Website Announced for Vietnam Veterans and Families

Feb. 22, 2012 - PRLog -- February 22, 2012, The 758th Supply and Service Company’s web site is a collection of photos, videos and commentary chronicling life in Fort Riley Kansas, Camp Davies, Phu Loi, and Saigon from 1966 thru 1970. Veterans of the 758th, families, and friends are invited to participate and make contributions to the site, or simply look at what is available. This social site is intended to be member driven. Membership is free. You must become a member to submit Photos, Videos or commentary. If you do not wish to become a member, feel free to just browse the site.  In addition to photo and videos, there is also a chat feature on the website. Suggestions for improving the site are always welcome.
Drop in anytime and take a look around. The website WILL be updated on a regular basis with new content, so please visit regularly.
Of special interest on the site currently is the Phu Loi base camp during 1968.  A great account has been made by David Hill, an excerpt of his accounting follows.
“While delegates began peace negotiations in Paris, the war in Vietnam once again flared up to new levels of combat.  On May 5, 1968 communist forces attacked  Saigon and 118 other South Vietnamese district and provincial capitals, major cities and allied military installations.   The so-called “Tet II” or “Mini-Tet Offensive” attacks marked a sharp resurgence in communist efforts to carry the war from the border frontiers into the population centers of the South.   At least eight NVA regiments and as many NVA “Infiltration Groups” (each a battalion-plus size unit) were now known to be operating within or moving into the area west, north and northeast of Saigon.  With major enemy troop movements through War Zones C and D toward Saigon and its environs, the Long Range Patrol teams of Co. F/52nd Inf. (LRP) were now tasked to screen major bases in the Big Red One’s Tactical Area of Operations.   On May 7, 1968, two Co. F teams, Wildcat 1 and Wildcat 2, were assigned the mission to aggressively conduct reconnaissance and ambush patrols outside of  the major 1st Division installation of Phu Loi.  
Located approximately 30 kilometers northeast of Saigon, along National Route 13, Phu Loi was headquarters for the Big Red One’s Division Artillery, its armored cavalry unit (1st Sq./4th Cavalry), and other key division units.  Team Wildcat 1 was led by SSgt Jack Liesure and comprized of Assistant Team Leader Roger Anderson, Charley Hartsoe and Chris Ferris.    Team Wildcat 2 was led by Sgt. Ronnie Luse and comprised of Assistant Team Leader Robert Elsner, Bill Cohn, Al Coleman, Dave Hill, and John Mills.   The LRRP teams would be operating under the command and control of Division Artillery HQ.   Surrounded by vast rice paddies (dry at this time of the year), rubber trees and the villages that supported those agricultural activities, Phu Loi had been the scene of fierce fighting during the 1968 Tet offensive.   Major units of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) troops had used the area around Phu Loi for pre-Tet staging and as a jumping-off point for their attacks on Saigon and surrounding U.S. and South Vietnamese installations.   Co. F (LRP) Team Wildcat 2, led by Sgt. Luse, had on January 31, 1968, spotted an estimated VC/NVA regiment attempting a night crossing north of Phu Loi from Dog Leg Village (named “Dog Leg” by the Americans, due to its  “L” shaped appearance from the air)  to An My, and conducted an artillery ambush against them, prematurely triggering the first Tet attacks against Phu Loi.   After being nearly decimated by the artillery and air support called in by the LRRPs, the surviving enemy troops had escaped into the nearby village of An My, which itself became the scene of a vicious battle, as elements of the Division’s 1st Bn/28th Inf.  and  1st Sq./4th Cavalry fought for the next few days to roust the communist force from the village.   Ironically, Team 2 received credit only for spotting the enemy troops, the official “After Action Report” failing to mention that the LRRPs had actually  remained in their ambush position and adjusted  artillery and aerial fire on the NVA/VC force throughout the night of 31 January.   The LRRPs withdrew to Phu Loi base camp only after the enemy had moved into An My. 1st Division G-2 (Intelligence) believed that, with the renewed attacks and continued sharp fighting in Saigon, the area around  Phu Loi would again be a major transit route for the communist forces.   With the VC Main Force units nearly eliminated during Tet, the communist forces were known to now be predominantly NVA, with VC Local Force soldiers acting as guides to move them through villages and way-stations to Saigon.  G-2 and the LRRPs felt that they might again be able to spot major crossings of enemy troops near Phu Loi and hit them before they could get to their objectives either of Phu Loi itself or Saigon and major allied installations surrounding it.    Increasingly, Co. F missions were being designed as long-range “ambush” patrols.   Over the course of the previous year, the Co.F LRRPs, had transitioned from “sneak-and-peak” tactics to a policy of  “hit ‘em hard every chance you get, with everything that could be brought to bear”.    They were not to take suicidal risks, but opportunities to hit the enemy now superceded purely reconnaissance-type missions.   The teams would have first call on available artillery and air support, and were not reluctant to use it.    Many missions, like those the LRRPs were to conduct around Phu Loi, were relatively short-range; but with the numerous enemy movements near major allied bases, long-range, heli-borne missions were being used less frequently—and the enemy was no longer either elusive or only out in the hinterlands.    While this strategy resulted in numerous and frequent clashes, with resultant large enemy casualties, it was eventually to result in increased LRRP/Ranger casualties as well.  
Teams 1 and 2 began their short-range night ambush patrols from Phu Loi, walking out to positions ranging from two to five kilometers beyond Phu Loi’s bunker line, and using alternating exit points and patrol directions.   One patrol started with a daylight truck ride to an Army Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) basecamp about five kilometers from Phu Loi, followed by a night patrol and ambush back toward Phu Loi, the LRRPs arriving back inside Phu Loi the following evening.   But initially, neither team was spotting enemy troops nor any signs indicating heavy NVA movement through the area.    Out of sheer frustration,  Team 1 had even sneaked in close to Dog Leg Village, placed a transistor radio loudly playing Vietnamese music on an adjacent  paddy berm, and backed away to observe the sight through their starlight night vision scope—hoping to at least attract one or more curious enemy soldiers into range of their ambush.   Nothing happened.   However, G-2 and the two team leaders were still convinced that enemy troops were crossing the rice paddies at some point near Phu Loi, and decided that one team would go deep into the open rice paddy area between Dog Leg Village and An My Village, seeing if “lightning would strike twice” at the same crossing location Luse’s Team 2 had so successfully exploited on 31 January.   Since it had been “Luse’s spot” in January, it was decided that Team 2 would take the first patrol to that area on the night of 10 May, with Liesure’s team standing-down that night, but available as a reaction force from Phu Loi.”  To view Mr. Davis’s entire work, please visit: http://www.angelfire.com/biz/VIETNAMBOOKS/History.html


Please visit our website:
http://www.758th.com

# # #

The 758th Supply and Service Company’s web site is a collection of photos, videos and commentary chronicling life in Fort Riley Kansas, Camp Davies, Phu Loi, and Saigon from 1966 thru 1970.